by Andrew Tucker
On 17 November the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2803 implementing the so-called Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict (the Plan) that was brokered by the United States on 29 September, and which had laid the foundation for the release of the hostages held by Hamas and other organizations in Gaza.
This plan, and the resolution, comprise an ambitious plan for the removal of Hamas and establishment of peace in Gaza. They basically envisage three successive phases:
- Phase 1: the return of all hostages held in Gaza and release by Israel of prisoners.
- Phase 2: the establishment of the Board of Peace, and an International Stabilization Force (ISF) to achieve the demilitarization of Hamas.
- Phase 3: the creation of an interim technocratic government, reform of the Palestinian Authority and training of a Palestinian police force, a possible pathway towards establishment of a Palestinian state, and the gradual rebuilding of Gaza.
While impressive on paper, the plan is now being confronted with the realities of the Middle East, and is already proving to be unrealistic.
The fact is that the plan is based on a number of false legal, historical and factual assumptions, which render the plan unrealistic and are likely to make it unworkable.
This short article addresses three of these problems in particular.
